Five-Party Talks to Guarantee Borders in South Asia

Threats of imminent conflict between India and Pakistan, following the Mumbai attacks of late November 2008, dissipated eventually, given both the sobering reality of nuclear weapons on either side and of India’s failure to temper Pakistan with Operation Parakram following the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. Against a backdrop of confused doctrines such as Cold Start and armed forces that are simply not materially or organizationally equipped for quick reaction, India is left with the usual options of engaging in rhetoric and diplomacy, both departments where Pakistan can more than match India. However, Pakistan’s capability in this latter respect comes from being the smaller power that has only to react to the bigger power, namely India, without having to come up with any initiatives of its own. It follows, therefore, that the way out can only come from India thinking out-of-the-box and coming up with an initiative that will force the other players in the region out of their zones of comfort and force them to walk the talk. What can this new initiative be?

Five-Party Talks – Explaining the Rationale

Continue reading “Five-Party Talks to Guarantee Borders in South Asia”

The Rise of China’s Cities

Original Presentation: “China’s Cities: New Centres of Political Power and Economic Growth,” Session on “Emerging Trends in China Studies: Politics & International Relations,” 3rd All India Conference of China Studies, organized by the Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi and Hariprasanna Biswas Centre for India-China Cultural Studies, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 20-21 (20) December 2010.

 

Summary: Centre-province relations in China have for some time now been a major focus of Chinese studies around the world, including in India. Very few however, attribute much agency to the provinces themselves except in the form of a source of fissiparous tendencies that include challenging the centre’s authority over issues of political self-interest and/or identity. However, provinces also have often tangled with the central government over economic policies and goods and in the post-reforms China, these have been a very important area of conflict between Beijing and the provinces. Many provinces have for example, objected to central government policies that impose excessive fiscal demands on them, while others have demanded preferential policies that would allow them to development their economies faster or to protect jobs and industries in their jurisdictions.

Even as these contestations have continued, China’s cities have risen as sites of power and opportunity in recent decades with huge potential impact on the territorial and administrative integrity of the provinces. Preliminary findings on the rise of China’s cities suggest that the central government has encouraged this new contest between provinces and their cities as a way of keeping provincial authorities under control in some instances. There is, meanwhile, also an economic logic driving the growth of cities in China, namely one of encouraging the development of economic growth hubs in the weaker and less developed provinces.

Political Economy of Arunachal Pradesh in a Rising India

Presentation: “Political Economy of Arunachal Pradesh in a Rising India,” Center for China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 14 December 2010.

 

Summary:  Arunachal Pradesh’s disputed status, unique socio-cultural makeup and difficult geographic location have elicited multifaceted responses from Indian policymakers. First, its disputed status and the shock of the 1962 border conflict have given it some features in common with other disputed territories bordering China, namely, a legacy of poor physical and communications infrastructure. Second, Arunachal’s demographic composition of minority ethnic groups has meant that it has like other states in Northeast India been protected from a demographic influx from the rest of India and its citizens enjoy special economic rights. Finally, the difficult geographic location of the Arunachal Pradesh has meant that it largely remains exoticized in the mainstream Indian imagination and hence little studied, and even lesser understood both by those in government and those outside.

 

However, in the post-liberalization era, and particularly in the new millennium with the dispute with China persisting, each of these three factors have also begun to shape Arunachal in slightly different ways from the rest of its Northeast Indian neighbours and indeed from the rest of the country. For one, the Indian government has abandoned its old policy of keeping border areas underdeveloped and is engaged in a massive infrastructure build-up in Arunachal. This naturally has a huge impact on previously important cultural and environmental concerns in the state. For another, Arunachal’s location is now sought to be used as an advantage in India’s economic outreach to Southeast Asia and southwest China. The presentation examines in detail how all these factors affect and mould the political economy of Arunachal Pradesh and the implications thereof for Sino-Indian relations.

Download presentation: JabinJacob-2010Dec14-CASS-PolEcon-Arunachal

Sino-Indian Relations at 60: Looking Ahead to the Next Decade

Original Presentation: “Sino-Indian Relations at 60: Looking Ahead to the Next Decade,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, Beijing, 13 December 2010.

Summary: The year 2010 marked the sixtieth anniversary of established diplomatic relations between China and India. Despite the initial euphoria attached to the concept of “Chindia,” the bilateral relationship between China and India continues to face numerous challenges.

 

While institutional links, dialogues, exchanges, and high-level visits will grow and flourish between India and China, they will not necessarily signify better relations. Both countries will continue to be wary of each other and their relationship will see a mix of cooperation and competition that is unlikely to change in the near to medium term.

 

Even if future armed conflict is unlikely, there is potential for a rivalry of U.S.-Soviet proportions and a “cold peace,” where proxies in other parts of the world are used to wage battles of influence by adopting either the Indian or Chinese model of political and economic development.

 

Read report


 

 

China and India: Two Rising Powers at Loggerheads

Original Article: “Chine et Inde: deux puissances émergentes antagonistes,”  Société de Stratégie – AGIR (Paris), No. 44, December 2010, pp. 43-56.

Abstract: Despite being among the fastest growing world economies, interactions between China and India remain limited owing to their unresolved boundary dispute. Concerns have grown over rapid military and infrastructure development by the two countries along the disputed boundary as well as over perceived and potential competition between them, both in their immediate neighbourhood as well as elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, there have also been instances of international cooperation such as at the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009. Thus, the key question of the ‘Asian century’ will be if these two rising powers and neighbours can manage their relationship in a manner that promotes peace, stability and economic development both regionally and globally.

Read more (in French) …

Sino-US Relations in the 21st Century

Original Presentation: “Sino-US Relations in the 21st Century,” The Contours of Sino-US Competition in the 21st Century and Implications for India, organized by the HQ Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, Government of India and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), 24 November 2010.

 

Summary:

“They’re not enemies, but frenemies, with codependent economies…”

The Sino-US relationship is without doubt the most important bilateral relationship in the world. It is also one of the most complex and difficult ones.

US policy on China appears to be one of whatever works, of “crossing the ocean by feeling the stones”, and it is difficult to say explicitly whether it is one of engagement, or containment or ‘congagement.’ As Kenneth Lieberthal puts it, the American dilemma is that “if China ends up being the one to really capture the economic upside of the region and we capture the security needs of the region, then China captures the [Asia-Pacific] region as a profit center and we capture the region as a cost center.” The Chinese for their part are confused is about the place of China in the world, especially if compared with the US, India, Japan, Russia or Europe and fear that the US could disrupt China’s rising regional influence.

In 2005 Robert Zoellick declared, “China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that enabled its success.” Implicit in this statement is the US’ central role in creating that system and in running it. The question for the future is whether China does not think the international system required for its continued success might have to be a different one altogether.

Sections

A. Understanding Chinese Self-perceptions – What is the Chinese Worldview?

B. China Watching the US

C. China Watching the US Watching China

D. Principal Actors on the Two Sides

E. Fundamentals of Sino-US Competition – “Frenemies”

F. What to Watch Out For in Future Sino-US Relations

Chinese National Security and International Relations

Original Lecture: “Chinese National Security and International Relations,” Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 29 October 2010.

 

Summary: An essential first step to understanding Chinese national security imperatives from the outside is to shed stereotypes and preconceived notions of China as a monolithic, monochromatic or well-ordered unitary entity. As a country of over a billion people, politics and implementation issues are incredibly complex in China and Indians should if anything, be able to better grasp this complexity.

 

Chinese national security policy is influenced by a number of internal issues, of which history and strategic culture are important variables, together with the overwhelming priority that Chinese leaders accord to maintaining political and social stability and thereby, their legitimacy and grip on power. Maintaining economic growth is a key national security consideration in this respect which then has implications for the way China looks at its external relations. Thus, traditional security issues such as its relations with Taiwan or non-traditional security issues such as energy security can both be affected by internal considerations. Meanwhile, China’s security policymaking process displays great complexity in terms of actors and interest groups ranging from the Communist Party, the PLA, and the MoFA to the state-owned enterprises and provincial governments. What is more, there are frequent conflicts of interest among the various players.

 

China has certain key concepts that it uses frequently in its external discourse that have specific meanings and need to be understood carefully. These include among others such concepts as ‘core interests’ – interests that China will go to war over – and the three ‘evils’ – extremism, terrorism and separatism. There is also a changing terminology used to describe China’s intentions such as ‘peaceful rise’ / ‘peaceful development’ / ‘harmonious world,’ each of which has different emphases. Finally, how China implements these concepts in practice is a different issue altogether.

‘Beijing is far away’

Original Lecture: “‘Beijing is far away’: The Provinces in China,” Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 25 October 2010.

 

This presentation examines the political and administrative system of China from the point of view of the provinces. Contrary to common perception and despite the highly authoritarian nature of China’s political system, actual authority is in most instances fragmented. Great diversities have always existed among Chinese provinces and the reach of central government has had its limitations. The constant struggle between central authority and local governments has been a dominant feature of governance in China right from its unification under the Qin dynasty to the present day. Imperial governments sought to maintain tight control of provincial appointments and revenues, and set strict limits to the scope of provinces for independent action, while the latter, on the other hand, sought sufficient autonomy to ensure effective local government. Even the Communist regime in China with all its centralizing tendencies has had to contend with this dynamic of governance – the struggle for provincial autonomy.

 

Studying centre-province and inter-province relationships in China from the perspective of the provinces, provides a new framework for analyzing political and economic developments in China. Altogether four distinct phenomena are examined:

– localism – centre-province competition

– provincialism – inter-province competition

– regionalism – inter-province cooperation

– transnationalism – province-foreign country linkages

A fifth issue might also be considered namely, intra-provincial competition and/or the rise of China’s cities

Examples are also given from India to help better understand these dynamics in India.

 

Download the full presentation: JabinJacob-2010Oct25-JNU-Beijing is far away

 

Will Emerging Powers Promote Democracy?

Original Article: Oliver Stuenkel and Jabin T. Jacob, “Rising powers and the future of democracy promotion: the case of Brazil and India,” Portuguese Journal of International Affairs (Lisbon), No. 4, Autumn/Winter 2010, pp. 23-30.

Extract: The decline of Western dominance, symbolized by the financial crisis in 2008 and the rise of emerging actors such as China, India and Brazil, will fundamentally change the way decisions are made at the international level. Power, and the responsibilities that come with it, will be more evenly spread across a larger number of stakeholders, creating potentially a more equitable world order. Power not only allows rising actors to participate in international negotiations but also increasingly allows countries such as China, India and Brazil to frame the debate and decide which issues should be discussed in the first place. In other words, rising powers will increasingly turn into global agenda setters. Apart from changing the way decisions are made, the rise of non-established powers such as India and Brazil on the one hand and China on the other, will also have an impact on the international discourse on political values and systems of governance.

…

In the short-run, it does seem likely that the rise of emerging powers will contribute to the decreasing importance of democracy promotion in the international political discourse. African dictators will show little inclination to accept loans laden with conditionalities if they can opt for Chinese, Indian or Brazilian loans without any strings attached and Central Asian despots will seek to take advantage of instability in their neighbourhood or the fear of possible chaos in their own country to play one power against the other. But in the long-run, as they grow and become more confident of their positions in the world order, at least some emerging powers might see that they have little to from kowtowing to dictators. They might also seek increasingly to distinguish themselves not so much from the West as from each other. And at least Brazil and India could well find that their democratic nature is an important marker also of their global identity and that democracy promotion is an useful tool of their national interests worldwide.

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