Prime Minister Modi’s statement at the All Party Meeting on 19 June ended up casting doubt on India’s own behaviour and claims along the LAC and actually encourages further Chinese assertiveness all along disputed sectors on the LAC as well as the temptation to open up fresh disputes.
What should be concerning in the wake of Galwan and the reported loss of lives also of Chinese troops, is that Beijing will now be particularly prone to viewing any Indian action as provocative and seek to respond in an overwhelming manner as a way of saving face.
The next ‘informal summit’ between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping will be held in Varanasi on 12 October. The announcement of the date has been accompanied in recent days by a series of reports on the state of affairs on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries. …
Instead of half-baked attempts at military diplomacy, India should impart greater clarity of expression and purpose to its military relationship with China. Is China a ‘strategic partner’ or a ‘strategic competitor’? Or both?
The persistent Sino-Indian boundary dispute needs to be seen within the framework of centre-periphery relations in China and India and well as of their different political systems.
2010 marked the sixtieth anniversary of established diplomatic relations between China and India. Despite the initial euphoria attached to the concept of “Chindia,” the bilateral relationship between China and India continues to face numerous challenges.