At the heart of any communist political system is the Marxist emphasis on class struggle with the apparent objective of achieving the utopia of a society of perfect equality and free from want. But the class struggle itself and attempts to either promote it or to deal with it are the result of or depend on the economic conditions obtaining in the polity. It is, therefore, not without reason that Marxists and leaders of communist nations have a constant focus on the economy or on economic conditions, never mind the effectiveness of their prescriptions.
China’s leaders have since the end of the Maoist era at least, not only been rather more careful than their counterparts in the former Soviet bloc countries in giving economic growth its due place, but also succeeded in shaping a successful economic model that has delivered decades of high rates of growth. They have understood the consequences of economic conditions for a country’s domestic politics and its international prospects better than most.
Continue reading Politics in Command in the Chinese Economy￼
1. The Beginning: What was the historical context, in China and in the world, of the birth of the Chinese Communist Party?
The CCP was formed in the crucible of a China beset by domestic upheaval, economic backwardness and a floundering experiment with a democratic republic that followed the fall of the Qing Empire. It was obvious to Chinese intellectuals that their country’s imperial greatness was a thing of the past and the search for national revival saw multiple ideologies contend during this period. The newly minted Soviet Union was keen to have more support in the east and sent cadre – including at one point, the Indian revolutionary, MN Roy – to support the growth of Chinese communism. The CCP also views the 1919 May 4th student movement as a seminal influence on many of its founders. The students were protesting the Chinese government’s inability at the Treaty of Versailles following the end of World War I, to get Western imperial powers and Japan to give up their territories and privileges in China. With the students also seeking a complete cultural and political overhaul calling for the adoption of science and democracy in place of traditional values, the May Fourth movement has continued to find its echo throughout Communist China’s history down to the present.
2. Early Decades: What political and ideological imperatives guided Mao Zedong in the decades of the 50s and 60s? What did the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution achieve for Mao and the CCP?
Continue reading The Chinese Communist Party Turns 100
The second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic has forced India to accept foreign aid – including from the Chinese Red Cross – for the first time in 16 years. For Indians of a certain persuasion, there is a particular shame in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Indian government having to seek foreign aid. For their worldview comprises a mix of various resentments against the perceived outsider – Muslims, Westerners/Christian missionaries, Chinese/atheists. Indeed, the strength of articulation of the vishwaguru trope lies precisely in this reality and the need to have something that is apparently of India’s ‘own’ to offer.
Continue reading From Akshayapatra to Begging Bowl
Even as India targets China in its alignment with the other democracies in the Quad, it is worth reflecting on how closely the temper and, to an extent the practice, of Indian foreign policy appears to be aligning with those of Chinese foreign policy. China’s assertiveness beyond its boundaries derives in large measure from the nature of the Communist Party of China (CPC) as a political party that does not believe in sharing power at home, from its conflation of regime interest with the national interest.
For Indians this should not be so hard to understand.
Continue reading Chinese Behaviour Both Target and Model for Indian Foreign Policy
A recent Indian news report pointed to the presence of Communist Party of China (CPC) members serving in several institutions that operated in India or had a connection with India. In one instance, at least one former employee of the Indian Consulate in Shanghai was clearly identified as a CPC member. A report in September this year had referred to a Chinese technology firm collecting open-source information about prominent Indians from all walks of life.Both reports are the result of a multi-country investigation by an international consortium of journalists.
Neither report should be the subject of such surprise or alarm as has been the case in India.
Continue reading Chinese Communists in in India: Much Ado About Nothing?
Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh (eds), China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’: Domestic and Foreign Policies under Xi Jinping (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
This volume discusses a range of key domestic forces driving the current Chinese growth ranging from economic reforms to governance practices to analyze their impact and influence at home as well as on China’s foreign and security policies in its near and extended neighbourhood. At the same time, the volume also looks at specific themes like technology, agricultural development, reform of state-owned enterprises and the use of Party bodies to engage in foreign propaganda work among other things to offer examples of the merging of Chinese domestic political and foreign policy interests. In the process, the book offers its readers a better idea of China’s place in the world as the Chinese themselves see it and the implications over time for China, its neighbourhood and the wider world.
For more details see publisher’s website.
1. ‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea for China’s Domestic and External Challenges
Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh
2. Reform of Party and State Structures in China
Nguyen Xuan Cuong
3. Changes in China’s Economic Development Model after the 19th National Congress
Nguyen Quang Thuan & Tran Hong Viet Continue reading Book : China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’: Domestic and Foreign Policies under Xi Jinping
Jabin T. Jacob, ‘“To Tell China’s Story Well”: China’s International Messaging during the COVID-19 Pandemic’, China Report, Vol. 56, No. 3 August 2020. 374-392.
The Covid-19 pandemic has dented China’s image as an efficient Party-state given how an effort to cover up the outbreak and the resulting delays in reporting led to the virus spreading beyond its origins in Wuhan in Hubei province to the rest of the country as well as rapidly across the world. This article examines China’s massive external propaganda effort launched as part of the effort to repair the damage to its global image and interests. It notes how China has not let the situation stop it from pursuing its traditional foreign policy and security interests, including, of competition with the United States. The article also argues that it is the ruling Communist Party of China’s concerns about its legitimacy at home that has determined the nature and scale of Chinese responses to the pandemic outside its borders.
Read the full article here.
The Indian government has a near perfect ground game in terms of messaging domestically on matters related to Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. And yet, ever since the standoffs with China began in early May, the government’s communications have been limited, confused, and confusing.
This is not to say that India’s military responses to either Pakistani or Chinese provocations – based on such information as is available in the open domain – has been wanting. In the case of the former, one could argue that even such an incident as Balakot where India attacked Pakistani territory, was calibrated well given that it did not lead to escalation. In the case of the Galwan Valley incident of 15 June, too, the official statement on the Prime Minister’s remarks at the All Party Meeting on 19 June quotes him saying, “that twenty of our brave soldiers made the supreme sacrifice for the nation in Ladakh but also taught a lesson to those who had dared to look towards our motherland”. This suggests that the Indians at least gave as good as they got. The Chinese, too, seemed to acknowledge casualties on their side. In dealing with a power like China with its superior military capabilities, that is as good as one can expect, and even something of a victory for India.
However, the question here for the Indian government is of communicating its position and version of events accurately both at home and abroad. The 19 June statement shows the Prime Minister prefacing his reference to the deaths of the soldiers by saying “that neither is anyone inside our territory nor is any of our post captured”. In reality, this obscured more than it clarified. While the present tense suggested that he could technically be accurate insofar as the situation at the moment of his speaking was concerned, the Hindi version – ““न तो किसी ने हमारी सीमा में प्रवेश किया है, न ही किसी भी पोस्ट पर कब्जा किया गया है” na to kisi ne hamari seema main pravesh kiya hain, na hi kisi bhi post par kabza kiya gaya hain – appeared to make a somewhat larger claim covering the entire period since confrontations started in May that neither had anyone entered Indian territory nor capturedany Indian posts.
Continue reading Confused and Confusing: The PM’s Official Statements About 15 June
Last week, the Nepalese government released a new map of the country which included Kalapani at the India-Nepal-Tibet trijunction as part of its territory, drawing immediate protest from India. Administered by the latter as part of its Uttarakhand state, the area has been a bone of contention for several decades now between Nepal and India.
Earlier, in November 2019, Kathmandu chose the occasion of the release of new Indian maps to reflect the reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir, to register fresh protests over the depiction of Kalapani as Indian territory. The trigger for the present Nepalese action seems to be the inauguration by the Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh of a new approximately 90km-long road to the Lipulekh Pass, across Kalapani. This route is one of the two through India for the annual pilgrimage to Kailash Mansarovar in Tibet. The other route through Nathu La in Sikkim was hitherto the only one with a proper road while the Lipulekh route involved an arduous three-week trek. With the new road, travel time from Delhi comes down to as little as three days. Continue reading A Growing Chinese Presence in Nepal