Despite the US withdrawal, it is too early for anyone to declare victory for China in Afghanistan
The non-military uses of China’s civilian infrastructure build-up in TAR or Xinjiang must not be ignored
Constant references to the ‘new’ to describe the Party-State’s views of developments on the Tibetan plateau underline Xi’s attempts to leave his personal stamp on Tibet policy.
What should be concerning in the wake of Galwan and the reported loss of lives also of Chinese troops, is that Beijing will now be particularly prone to viewing any Indian action as provocative and seek to respond in an overwhelming manner as a way of saving face.
While economic diplomacy is the mainstay, China’s maritime presence in the Middle East is also growing and together these support a clear and strong political message on China’s domestic and foreign policy interests that countries in the region are reluctant to contest.
The political, social and security implications do not look pretty for countries participating in the BRI. New Delhi might, however, consider if absolute opposition to the BRI is ultimately doing either its relationship with China or its own global image any long-term good.
General elections due next year in India are an opportunity for political parties to turn greater attention towards foreign policy issues and elevate the level of discussion on China in the popular domain.
When complaints are raised against BRI, Beijing is quick to publicly offer to renegotiate terms. India, meanwhile, is known in South Asia more for its big brotherly attitude and the lack of synergy and capacity to implement its promises.