There is a case to be made for an India-led initiative in the Indo-Pacific that displays greater commitment to upholding international law than to ‘inclusivity’ as well as willingness to take on a wider ambit of regional responsibilities in the security and political domains
In the second Modi term, New Delhi will have to do a better job than issuing statements on the BRI or ignoring it altogether and be willing to offer credible alternatives if it is retain any standing among its neighbours and further afield.
What does the election manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party say about China in national security terms?
The eventual listing of Masood Azhar as an international terrorist at the UN is as much a ‘big diplomatic win’ for China as for India – after all, Beijing prevented New Delhi from achieving the objective for ten years.
What does the election manifesto of the Indian National Congress say about China in national security terms?
The political, social and security implications do not look pretty for countries participating in the BRI. New Delhi might, however, consider if absolute opposition to the BRI is ultimately doing either its relationship with China or its own global image any long-term good.
India’s attenuation of economic links with Pakistan risk reducing its options in that country and making it even more dependant on China. New Delhi’s action shrinks its own leverage in South Asia while increasing China’s role.
Does India have it in itself to become an economic and political alternative to China?
When complaints are raised against BRI, Beijing is quick to publicly offer to renegotiate terms. India, meanwhile, is known in South Asia more for its big brotherly attitude and the lack of synergy and capacity to implement its promises.