Chinese Claims on Arunachal: A Consequence of the Sino-Tibetan Dispute

For China, Arunachal Pradesh or NEFA, as it was then known, had little significance in the early years of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Rather, the main Chinese claim was only the Aksai Chin area in the Indian northwest and this was best exemplified by China’s withdrawal from NEFA after ending the 1962 military operations.

In the mid-1980s, however, the core of the dispute for China shifted eastward to Arunachal Pradesh. At least three possible reasons can be highlighted for this new Chinese emphasis.  Continue reading “Chinese Claims on Arunachal: A Consequence of the Sino-Tibetan Dispute”

The BRICS Challenge: Converting Rhetoric to Leadership

Originally published: जबिन टी. जेकब, “सिर्फ बयानों से नहीं बढ़ेगा ब्रिक्स का वर्चस्व,” Business Bhaskar, 5 April 2012, p. 4.
(original text in English follows below the Hindi text)

क्या ग्लोबल इकोनॉमी में ब्रिक्स एक असरदार, संगठित और नेतृत्वकारी आवाज बन कर उभर सकता है? क्या ब्रिक्स देशों का एक साथ खड़ा होना क्या पश्चिमी वर्चस्व वाली मौजूदा विश्व व्यवस्था के लिए चुनौती बन सकता है? लेकिन दिल्ली में हाल में समाप्त हुए चौथे ब्रिक्स शिखर सम्मेलन से इन बड़े सवालों का कोई जवाब नहीं मिलता।

आर्थिक दायरे में तो ब्रिक्स देश पश्चिम के लिए बड़ी चुनौती बन सकते हैं। पश्चिमी देशों खास कर यूरो जोन में जारी आर्थिक संकट के इस दौर में ऐसा संभव है। दिल्ली घोषणा पत्र में तो पश्चिमी देशों को नसीहत भी दी गई कि वे मैक्रो इकोनॉमी और वित्तीय नीति के मोर्चे पर जिम्मेदारी का परिचय दें। इन देशों से साफ-साफ कहा गया कि उन्हें अपनी अर्थव्यवस्था में ढांचागत सुधार करने होंगे।

लेकिन सिर्फ बयान देने भर से विश्व व्यवस्था का नेतृत्व आपके हाथ में नहीं आ जाएगा। Continue reading “The BRICS Challenge: Converting Rhetoric to Leadership”

The fall of Bo Xilai and some reflections on Indian politics

The dust has not yet settled on the dismissal of Bo Xilai as Party Secretary of Chongqing, one of China’s four major city-level provinces (the equivalent of states in India). Bo’s fall was especially significant given he was a leading contender for membership of the all-powerful the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at its upcoming leadership transition in October.

What does this event say about the Chinese political system? And what reflections might we derive about the Indian political system? Continue reading “The fall of Bo Xilai and some reflections on Indian politics”

To Intervene or Not to Intervene?

China recently announced a defence budget of over US$100 billion as part of its continuing military modernization. Many observers outside China, including those from India, have concluded that this massive buildup indicates that China is intent on making war with its neighbours.

China’s intentions, however, are seldom as clear-cut as they are made out be. If anything, there is more debate than certainty in Beijing on how best to maximize Chinese influence and interests abroad. Continue reading “To Intervene or Not to Intervene?”

Institutionalizing the BCIM: The Next Steps

Presentation made in Session 5: Institutional Arrangements at the 10th Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Regional Cooperation Forum, Kolkata, 19 February 2012.

There has been a constant debate between India and China about bringing the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Regional Cooperation Forum up to the full Track-1 level. There is the example of the Russia-India-China Track-2 dialogue that has a parallel Track-1 process starting with meetings of the three foreign ministers and later followed by regular meetings of the heads of government. This was no doubt inspired also by the post-9/11 scenario of unilateral US actions and the need for an alternative global order formulation. The point is that this can be done.

Today, the BCIM is in effect a Track-1.5 process, involving both scholars as well as officials even if the level of official participation varies from country to country. It is understood that for all the flexibility of the Track-2 mechanism, any real action is only possible if government officials are involved.  But since the flexibility is useful, a case can be made for Track-1.5 plus Track-1 level interactions, so that governments have a role to play at all stages. Continue reading “Institutionalizing the BCIM: The Next Steps”

Regional Connectivity: The Gaps ‘on the Ground’

Presentation made in Session 3: Regional Connectivity: Tourism, Transport & Infrastructure at the 10th Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Regional Cooperation Forum, Kolkata, 18 February 2012

Assam has the look of great reserves of strength and potential power…I have no doubt that great highways by road, air and rail will go across her connecting China and India, and ultimately connecting East Asia with Europe. Assam will then no longer be an isolated far away province but an important link
between the East and West.

Jawaharlal Nehru

after a visit to then undivided Assam, December 1945[1]

Nearly 70 years later – including over 10 years of the BCIM initiative – regional connectivity has little to show by way of progress. There is an almost never-ceasing flow of ideas, as well there should be, in a sub-region with a long history of cultural and economic connections. But despite the end of the Cold War and the rapid expansion of regionalism the world over, including in the immediate neighbourhood in the form of various ASEAN mechanisms and the SCO, the BCIM sub-region seems caught in a time warp of sorts. Why is this the case?

One part of the answer might lie in other regional mechanism that neighbours the BCIM initiative, namely, SAARC. With the South Asian grouping still moribund, let us face it – the infection that ails the BCIM process is of Indian subcontinental origins.  The connectivity “gaps” in the BCIM sub-region extend to 4 major areas: population movement, transport infrastructure, communications infrastructure and development infrastructure.
Continue reading “Regional Connectivity: The Gaps ‘on the Ground’”

15th Sino-Indian SR Talks: Moving Beyond the Boundary Dispute?

Originally published: Jabin T. Jacob, “China-India Special Representatives Talks: Moving Beyond the Boundary Dispute?” RSIS Commentaries, No. 029/2012, 20 February 2012.

2012 marks a sensitive anniversary in Sino-Indian relations – 50 years of the conflict over their disputed boundary in 1962 that led to a quick and humiliating defeat for India. In half a century, however, relations between the two countries have been radically transformed in several areas – bilateral trade is booming and China and India share concerns over regional and global issues such as the situation in AfPak, energy security, climate change and the reform of international organizations.

And yet, these new interactions and common interests have created their own set of problems such as a mounting Indian trade deficit, for example, or the competition for energy resources. Meanwhile, the persistence of their boundary dispute further ensures that relations remain beset by mistrust and a sense of rivalry.

Changing Attitudes Continue reading “15th Sino-Indian SR Talks: Moving Beyond the Boundary Dispute?”

2012 Kicks Off: No Visas and More Boundaries

In Sino-Indian relations, it would appear that the more things change, the more they remain the same. Or do they?

2012 was still young when another ‘visa issue’ cropped up between China and India. This time the Chinese refused a visa to an Indian Air Force officer from Arunachal Pradesh slated to leave for China as part of a 30-member Indian military delegation.  Contrary to expectations, however, the visit actually carried on with the delegation being halved in size and the IAF officer in question one of the 15 who were dropped. One can wonder about the wisdom of deliberately including an Arunachali in any delegation to China when the person is sure to run into a (great) wall. But perhaps this was, as is normal in the practice of statecraft, simply a testing of the waters? Continue reading “2012 Kicks Off: No Visas and More Boundaries”

Shifting Equilibrium: Explaining Sino-Indian Relations since 2005

I never imagined that there would come the day when I would go to Kerala, my home state, for a conference on Sino-Indian relations – which come to think of it, is rather strange given the long historical connections Kerala has had with China. (But it is maybe not so strange when one considers the poor quality of higher education in Kerala.) The initiative for the conference held in December 2011  and supported by the University Grants Commission (UGC), the Ministry of External Affairs and the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), was taken by a senior of mine from the Centre for East Asian Studies, JNU, Dr. CR Pramod, now a lecturer at the Sree Kerala Varma College, Thrissur, which hosted the conference.

I suppose it’s a sign of the pace of change in Sino-Indian relations or at least of the quantum jump in the level of interest in China in India, that conferences on Sino-Indian relations are being held in places so far from New Delhi. In fact, I believe the future of China Studies in India and any hope for balance in Indian perceptions of China, lies in taking China Studies outside Delhi to the other metros and smaller towns, so that more ordinary Indians have a chance to participate in the making of China policy, and a greater variety and number of views and ideas are generated – more on this, at some point in the future.

For now, the presentation I made at this conference was an attempt at conceptualizing Sino-Indian relations since 2005, when the landmark Agreement on Guiding Principles and Political Parameters was signed between the two countries. I argue that Sino-Indian relations have since then entered a period of flux certainly but for all that they remain on even keel. At the same time, there is a real element of learning and progress in the relationship – what I call shifting equilibrium.

For a slightly modified version of the the presentation I made, largely in bullet points see JabinTJacob-SinoIndRelations2005-ShiftingEquilibrium