With the COVID-19 pandemic, the name “Wuhan” has become much better known in India than it ever was for the April 2018 informal summit between Modi and Xi in that city. It remains to be seen which of these two legacies from Wuhan will last in India-China relations.
There is little that actually changes on the ground on the LAC between India and China despite the latter’s rhetoric. It could also be reasonably argued that a change in the status of J&K is not a major concern for China in so far as it involves Pakistan.
There is no real Tibet card for New Delhi to play and India ignores its own Buddhists while supporting the Dalai Lama.
Review of Shiv Kunal Verma’s ‘1962: The War That Wasn’t’
China’s operationalization of the Zangmu hydropower station on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra must be seen in the context of environmental developments elsewhere in the country.
The persistent Sino-Indian boundary dispute needs to be seen within the framework of centre-periphery relations in China and India and well as of their different political systems.
Originally published as ‘Interpreting Modispeak on China’, The Hindu (Chennai), 14 May 2015. As Indian Prime Ministers and political leaders go, Narendra Modi is unique in possessing some significant experience of that country before attaining office. In fact, despite – or perhaps, because of – the differences in world views and how he has gone about understandingContinue reading “Interpreting Prime Minister Modi’s China Approach”
In India, it is easier to blame individuals for mistakes made than to identify and correct failings and shortcomings in the institutions and processes that individuals are only a part of.
Indian infrastructure development in its border areas is a complex mix of national security considerations, political gamesmanship and economic rent-seeking