An August 29 interview of China’s Special Envoy on the Afghanistan Yue Xiaoyong offers a useful overview of China’s views and concerns about the situation in the aftermath of the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The Chinese envoy’s reference to “The irresponsible and hasty withdrawal of the troops of the United States as well as the NATO” indicates that the Chinese too have been caught in a situation where they are not prepared with options. The fact that the interview was conducted in English suggests among other things that they are not shy of letting the world know this.
China has at least two challenges before it with implications for its security. One, in managing the Taliban itself, and the other in terms of impact on its other neighbours.
Continue reading China in Afghanistan: Not Ready for the Burden
With a new administration taking over in the US, how will China deal with the legacy of hard-line China policies left behind by Donald Trump?
For one, expect Beijing to try deflection. It will talk about being misunderstood and of overriding “common interests” as Foreign Minister Wang Yi did in December 2020, and his deputy Le Yucheng as well as Chinese Vice-President Wang Qishan did at the end of January 2021 or to spout vague inanities as “cooperative competition” as former Chinese diplomat Fu Ying did earlier in November in The New York Times. The objective is to sound conciliatory even as China puts forward its interests clearly. For instance, the People’s Daily’s Zhong Sheng column, which during the Trump years did not mince words in attacking the US and its actions, welcomed the Biden administration with a toning down of language and offers of cooperation.
Continue reading China’s Possible Approaches to the US under Joe Biden
It is not surprising that American president-elect Joe Biden wants to reverse much of the incumbent Donald Trump’s shambolic and disruptive foreign policies. But on at least one aspect of Trump’s foreign policy – China – Biden should be building on and staying the course.
The only change required is to forego Trump’s propensity to cut deals with the Chinese in favour of short-term gains. Biden can bring in consistency and firmness and be willing to make it costly for China to renege on promises. But there are already at least two Biden moves with implications for China policy that raise some concerns about how well the incoming administration understands China or America’s partners.
Continue reading Biden’s China Agenda: Two Missteps Require Repair
Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh (eds), China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’: Domestic and Foreign Policies under Xi Jinping (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
This volume discusses a range of key domestic forces driving the current Chinese growth ranging from economic reforms to governance practices to analyze their impact and influence at home as well as on China’s foreign and security policies in its near and extended neighbourhood. At the same time, the volume also looks at specific themes like technology, agricultural development, reform of state-owned enterprises and the use of Party bodies to engage in foreign propaganda work among other things to offer examples of the merging of Chinese domestic political and foreign policy interests. In the process, the book offers its readers a better idea of China’s place in the world as the Chinese themselves see it and the implications over time for China, its neighbourhood and the wider world.
For more details see publisher’s website.
1. ‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea for China’s Domestic and External Challenges
Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh
2. Reform of Party and State Structures in China
Nguyen Xuan Cuong
3. Changes in China’s Economic Development Model after the 19th National Congress
Nguyen Quang Thuan & Tran Hong Viet Continue reading Book : China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’: Domestic and Foreign Policies under Xi Jinping
Jabin T. Jacob, ‘“To Tell China’s Story Well”: China’s International Messaging during the COVID-19 Pandemic’, China Report, Vol. 56, No. 3 August 2020. 374-392.
The Covid-19 pandemic has dented China’s image as an efficient Party-state given how an effort to cover up the outbreak and the resulting delays in reporting led to the virus spreading beyond its origins in Wuhan in Hubei province to the rest of the country as well as rapidly across the world. This article examines China’s massive external propaganda effort launched as part of the effort to repair the damage to its global image and interests. It notes how China has not let the situation stop it from pursuing its traditional foreign policy and security interests, including, of competition with the United States. The article also argues that it is the ruling Communist Party of China’s concerns about its legitimacy at home that has determined the nature and scale of Chinese responses to the pandemic outside its borders.
Read the full article here.
There are three ‘cold wars’ that have been underway for some time, which involve India and China. Each shows both how much the world has changed since the ‘original’ Cold War between the US and the USSR and how distinct in their worldviews and approaches India and China are from the superpowers of an earlier era. These cold wars are also now picking up pace.
The first cold war is a direct one. Mutual trust has never been a strong suit of the India-China relationship but the ongoing Chinese transgressions along the LAC indicate a significant breakdown of long-standing bilateral agreements and can be considered a tipping point. For the foreseeable future, LAC face-offs involving violent physical altercations and possibly casualties will be the norm. And yet, these are unlikely to escalate into full-fledged conflict even as both sides criticise each other more openly in bilateral and multilateral conversations.
What also separates the India-China cold war from its predecessor between the superpowers is the deep and growing economic linkages between the two sides. Another feature is the distinct asymmetry in both the military and economic equations in China’s favour. But while calls in India for selectively boycotting Chinese goods are unlikely to work, the Indian government can still prevent any further Chinese ingress in the form of capital and technologies. Given its own political economy, this might be more of a concern for China, than the LAC itself. Asymmetry, thus, does not necessarily mean lack of leverage for India and avenues for negotiations and compromises will exist in the relationship.
Continue reading India, China and their Accelerating Cold Wars
Chinese analysts saw Narendra Modi’s reelection as Prime Minister as a foregone conclusion. What came as a surprise to them – as it did to many in India – was the scale of Modi’s victory. Many assumed – going by Indian press reports and conversations with Indian visitors – that Modi would return with a reduced mandate and be forced into a coalition government. The implication here was that Modi would not have as free a hand in governance and foreign policy as he did in his first term.
What then do the Chinese expect from the second Modi administration? Continue reading Chinese Expectations from Modi 2.0
India-China relations went through a year of relative calm in 2018. This was the result of the so-called ‘Wuhan Spirit’ – after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in the Chinese city in April to attempt to sort out tensions in the relationship following the several months-long standoff in Doklam (Dolam) in Bhutan middle of last year. However, this respite must be considered unusual for the goal that China under Xi has set itself is of racing to the top of the global hierarchy at the apparent expense of the United States and India certainly is seen only as a bit player in this story. Continue reading 2019: What’s in Store for India-China Relations?
US Vice-President Mike Pence delivered a key speech on his country’s China policy early this month on 4 October 2018. His speech drove home the message of the burgeoning challenge to American interests from China. Using specific examples, he pointed out how the Chinese sought to influence American domestic politics, stole American technology, and undermined other countries through debt-trap infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative.
Implications for India
Pence’s speech on China has also been read as being politically motivated given the November mid-term elections to the US Congress. While this may be so, it also offers Indians an opportunity to think why their country’s foreign policy challenges from China do not form more of an issue at least during parliamentary elections. Continue reading Raising China as an Issue in Indian Elections