Jabin T. Jacob, ‘“To Tell China’s Story Well”: China’s International Messaging during the COVID-19 Pandemic’, China Report, Vol. 56, No. 3 August 2020. 374-392. Abstract The Covid-19 pandemic has dented China’s image as an efficient Party-state given how an effort to cover up the outbreak and the resulting delays in reporting led to the virus spreadingContinue reading “Journal Article : China’s External Propaganda during the COVID-19 Pandemic”
Iran is no passive actor in the Sino-Indian contest but capable of playing the two sides against each other.
China’s BRI is a whole-of-the-system approach to build on physical connectivity projects and expand these to include other softer, subtler forms of connectivity.
The Chinese people are anxious. The Communist Party of China (CPC) that governs them even more so.
Chinese transgressions along the LAC indicate a significant breakdown of long-standing bilateral agreements and can be considered a tipping point. The situation will likely result in a variegated set of cold wars between India and China.
Given that China has both more money than India and diplomatic capacity that matches that of the US, it will remain a significant player in Sri Lanka.
There is little that actually changes on the ground on the LAC between India and China despite the latter’s rhetoric. It could also be reasonably argued that a change in the status of J&K is not a major concern for China in so far as it involves Pakistan.
In the second Modi term, New Delhi will have to do a better job than issuing statements on the BRI or ignoring it altogether and be willing to offer credible alternatives if it is retain any standing among its neighbours and further afield.
While economic diplomacy is the mainstay, China’s maritime presence in the Middle East is also growing and together these support a clear and strong political message on China’s domestic and foreign policy interests that countries in the region are reluctant to contest.