The next ‘informal summit’ between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping will be held in Varanasi on 12 October. The announcement of the date has been accompanied in recent days by a series of reports on the state of affairs on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries.Continue reading “India-China Boundary Dispute: LAC Transgressions Will Continue”
In the second Modi term, New Delhi will have to do a better job than issuing statements on the BRI or ignoring it altogether and be willing to offer credible alternatives if it is retain any standing among its neighbours and further afield.
While economic diplomacy is the mainstay, China’s maritime presence in the Middle East is also growing and together these support a clear and strong political message on China’s domestic and foreign policy interests that countries in the region are reluctant to contest.
What does the election manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party say about China in national security terms?
The eventual listing of Masood Azhar as an international terrorist at the UN is as much a ‘big diplomatic win’ for China as for India – after all, Beijing prevented New Delhi from achieving the objective for ten years.
What does the election manifesto of the Indian National Congress say about China in national security terms?
The political, social and security implications do not look pretty for countries participating in the BRI. New Delhi might, however, consider if absolute opposition to the BRI is ultimately doing either its relationship with China or its own global image any long-term good.
India’s democracy and its largely free and fair elections and the uncertainties they throw up, strongly challenge the ideas China’s communists have about order and stability, of ‘harmony’ in society and politics as represented by one-party rule.
While there is a clear case of Chinese double standards on terrorism, India has not helped its cause by failing to take a consistent position on the issue with China.