With a new administration taking over in the US, how will China deal with the legacy of hard-line China policies left behind by Donald Trump?
For one, expect Beijing to try deflection. It will talk about being misunderstood and of overriding “common interests” as Foreign Minister Wang Yi did in December 2020, and his deputy Le Yucheng as well as Chinese Vice-President Wang Qishan did at the end of January 2021 or to spout vague inanities as “cooperative competition” as former Chinese diplomat Fu Ying did earlier in November in The New York Times. The objective is to sound conciliatory even as China puts forward its interests clearly. For instance, the People’s Daily’s Zhong Sheng column, which during the Trump years did not mince words in attacking the US and its actions, welcomed the Biden administration with a toning down of language and offers of cooperation.
Continue reading China’s Possible Approaches to the US under Joe Biden
In late September this year, the Communist Party of China (CPC) scored a propaganda coup by conducting a two-day training programme in Kathmandu for top leaders and cadre of the ruling Nepal Communist Party. To think that this has happened in their near neighbourhood should worry Indian policymakers but it is also important to understand Chinese motivations and the tools at their disposal for these have implications for political systems everywhere, and especially for democracies.
In mid-December 2018, at a speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the beginning of economic reforms and opening up in China, CPC General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out that as a result of its economic reforms and growth, China had ‘significantly raised its cultural soft power and the international influence of Chinese culture’. Continue reading The Many Instruments of Chinese Foreign Policy
In an age of extremes, of hyperbole, and of tall promises, a headline announcing that getting Pakistani terrorist Masood Azhar sanctioned by the UN’s 1267 Committee is a ‘big’ diplomatic win for India should not be surprising. It would however, be worrying if Government of India officials or responsible political leaders were to also parrot this line.
India’s Permanent Representative to the UN was calm in his tweet declaring that Azhar had been designated a terrorist. Finance Minister Arun Jaitely, however, at a press conference on behalf of the ruling BJP could not resist taking potshots at the opposition Congress, criticizing it for asking, “what is the big deal?” and went on to call the listing ‘badi kootnitik vijay’ (big diplomatic victory). Continue reading Listing Masood Azhar as Global Terrorist: China Helps India to a Pyrrhic Victory
Originally published as Jabin T. Jacob, “China in Southeast Asia: The Search for a Chinese Model of International Relations,” Special Issue: China and Southeast Asia, China Report, Vol. 48, No. 3, August 2012, pp. 317-326.
Abstract: Despite China’s claims of a foreign policy of ‘peaceful rise’/‘peaceful development’ and of seeking a ‘harmonious world’, and despite its economic openness and active participation in economic multilateralism, China’s neighbours continue to be concerned about the overall direction and intent of Beijing’s security policies. These concerns are particularly heightened by China’s rapid military modernization of the past couple of decades. The announcement in 2010 that China considered its territorial claims in the South China Sea a ‘core interest’, can be seen as a setback to its regional diplomacy, so diligently crafted over the years and drove its Southeast Asian neighbours to seek closer engagement with the US. This article argues that the contradictions evident in China’s neighbourhood foreign policy reflect its continuing search for a model of international relations that can balance its domestic interests such as the need for political stability, including regime stability, on the one hand and its external ambitions for a decisive role in regional affairs, on the other.
Read the full article here.