The danger now exists – as was the case post-Doklam in 2017 – that the Indian government could once again take its foot off the gas pedal of sustained political, diplomatic, military and economic pressure on China in order to achieve short-term interests. (C R Sasikumar)

While Indian statements on the bilateral relationship with China are exercises in brevity, Chinese statements are more expansive by comparison. Taken together, however, they provide a picture of how the relationship is evaluated by each side. With the 23rd meeting of the Special Representatives (SRs) on the India-China boundary question concluding in Beijing earlier this week, bilateral exchanges at the highest levels might have gotten closer to regular service but the meeting also highlights continuing differences.

Comparing the six statements on SR meetings that have come out (three from each country) since the first “informal summit” between Indian Prime Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan in 2018 — the 21st (in Chengdu, November 2018), the 22nd (in New Delhi, December 2019) and the latest one — it is evident that the Indian side has increasingly weak expectations of the relationship.

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